Emory International Law Review
Volume 33

Issue 4

2019

Fictions of the Final Frontier: Why the United States SPACE Act of
2015 Is Illegal
Kurt Taylor

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr

Recommended Citation
Kurt Taylor, Fictions of the Final Frontier: Why the United States SPACE Act of 2015 Is Illegal, 33 Emory
Int'l L. Rev. 653 (2019).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol33/iss4/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory International Law Review by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

TAYLORCOMMENTPROOFS_6.5.19

6/5/2019 11:15 AM

FICTIONS OF THE FINAL FRONTIER: WHY THE UNITED
STATES SPACE ACT OF 2015 IS ILLEGAL
ABSTRACT
In 2015, the United States passed The Spurring Private Aerospace
Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship Act of 2015 (the “SPACE Act of 2015”),
a domestic law creating private celestial property rights for any US citizen who
can appropriate an outer space resource. This creation of a private property
interest stands in stark opposition to the Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (the “Outer Space
Treaty”), which entered into force in 1967. The Outer Space Treaty is accepted
by all space-faring nations, and it contains a non-appropriation doctrine in
Article II that bars states from claiming territorial ownership of celestial bodies
and resources. There is a split among academics on how to interpret the Article
II prohibition. Specifically, many are not sure whether the appropriation extends
only to sovereigns (by a narrow interpretation), or if it covers private entities as
well (by a broad interpretation).
This Comment argues that a broad interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty
is proper, and that the SPACE Act of 2015 violates the Treaty’s bar on
appropriation. Taking into account methods of treaty interpretation and
examining the historical context at the time the Treaty was drafted supports a
broad interpretation. This Comment proposes that there is indeed much to be
desired by allowing and supporting celestial development, but that a change in
the international regulatory regime is necessary to allow the SPACE Act of 2015
to operate without violating the Outer Space Treaty.
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INTRODUCTION
A man in California has a vision to achieve what is out of reach for even the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). His idea seems crazy,
but he says he can pull it off in less than six years.1 The vision: to send humans
to Mars.2
Elon Musk presented a concrete business plan for sending humans to Mars
during a conference on September 22, 2017.3 Musk’s company, SpaceX, is a
private American aerospace organization that is the market leader in the United
States space travel industry, and one of the most prominent private aerospace
travel companies in the world.4 The dreams of Mr. Musk are not all that out of
reach, given SpaceX’s accomplishments and milestones. SpaceX is the first
private company successfully to launch cargo rockets to the International Space
Station,5 but Musk is not alone in these endeavors.
Another American company, Moon Express, is working to launch the first
private lunar mission to the Moon with hopes, eventually, to mine it.6 Companies
like SpaceX and Moon Express are not only proposing big ideas, there is big
money behind them and they fully intend to put it to work.7 SpaceX is valued at
around $21 billion,8 and Moon Express has raised over $45 million,9
demonstrating the seriousness and commitment that private companies are
willing to put forth to advance human interaction with outer space to a new level.

1

SPACEX, http://www.spacex.com/mars (last visited Feb. 2, 2018).
Id.
3
Adam Baidawi & Kenneth Chang, Musk’s Mars Vision: A One-Size-Fits-All Rocket. A Very Big One,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2017, at B3, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/28/science/elon-musk-mars.html.
4
Jay Bennett, One Chart Shows How Much SpaceX Has Come to Dominate Rocket Launches, POPULAR
MECHANICS (July 13, 2017), https://www.popularmechanics.com/space/rockets/a27290/one-chart-spacexdominate-rocket-launches/.
5
Kenneth Chang, First Private Craft Docks With Space Station, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2012, at A12,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09First%20Private%20Craft%20Docks%20With%20Space%20Station/28/scie
nce/elon-musk-mars.html.
6
Fact Sheet–Moon Express Payload Review Determination, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.
gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=20595; MOON EXPRESS, http://www.moonexpress.com/
expeditions/ (last visited October 5, 2018).
7
Baidawi & Chang, supra note 3; FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 6.
8
Katie Benner & Kenneth Chang, SpaceX is Now One of the World’s Most Valuable Privately Held
Companies, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/technology/spacex-is-now-oneof-the-worlds-most-valuable-privately-held-companies.html.
9
Lori Loannou, Billionaire Closer to Mining the Moon for Trillions of Dollars in Riches, CNBC (Jan.
31, 2017, 8:13 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/31/billionaire-closer-to-mining-moon-for-trillions-ofdollars-in-riches.html.
2
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But what if they cannot? What if it is all for nothing? What if the very dreams
that these billions of dollars stand for are completely illegal? A domestic U.S.
law, The Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship Act
of 2015 (SPACE Act of 2015), creates private celestial property rights for any
U.S. citizen who can appropriate an outer space resource.10 This creation of a
property right contradicts the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (Outer Space Treaty), which
prohibits appropriation of celestial bodies and resources,11 creating dissonance
between domestic U.S. law and an international treaty to which the United States
is a party.
On November 19, 2015, President Obama signed into law the SPACE Act
of 2015.12 Aimed at supporting outer space endeavors like those of SpaceX and
Moon Express, the Act provides legal support for private ownership of outer
space resources.13 Among other things, the Act provides that United States
citizens have the right to appropriate property in outer space for commercial
purposes, and to do so “free from harmful interference.”14
Internationally, the Outer Space Treaty entered into force in 1967 and has
wide acceptance by all space-faring states,15 with a total of 107 signatories.16
The Treaty is widely viewed as the principal international legal instrument
governing outer space,17 and it entered into force on the heels of the 1957 Soviet
Union launch of Sputnik-1, cognizant of the Cold War “Space Race” between
the United States and the Soviet Union.18 Article II of the Treaty contains its

10

See H.R. 2262, 114th Cong. (2015).
See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into
force Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
12
H.R. 2262, 114th Cong. (2015).
13
See id.
14
Id.
15
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11.
16
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, U.N.,
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/outer_space (last visited Oct. 26, 2017).
17
See Brian Wessel, The Rule of Law in Outer Space: The Effects of Treaties and Nonbinding Agreements
on International Space Law, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 289, 292 (2012); Leslie Tennen, Symposium:
The Promise and Perils of an International Law of Property Enterprise Rights and the Legal Regime for
Exploitation of Outer Space Resources, 47 UNIV. PAC. L. REV. 281, 282 (2016).
18
See Matthew J. Kleiman, Space Law 101: An Introduction to Space Law, A.B.A., https://www.
americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_series/space_law_101_an_introdu
ction_to_space_law.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2017); FRANS VON DER DUNK, International Space Law, in
HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 29, 35 (Frans von der Dunk ed., 2015).
11
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non-appropriation doctrine concerning the use of celestial resources.19 The
specific language in Article II refers to “national appropriation by a claim of
sovereignty,”20 and many scholars accept that the Article exists to bar nations
from claiming territorial ownership of celestial bodies and resources.21 It is
without question that drafters of the Outer Space Treaty only contemplated state
actor interest in, and ability to actually fund and develop, space-faring
technologies.
The state of international culture and technology is very different today than
it was during the emergence of the Outer Space Treaty fifty years ago.22 Outer
space is no longer the domain of exclusively state actors; a shift to private-sector
development of space is underway.23 It remains unsettled whether the nonappropriation doctrine in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty covers: (1) all
entities, thus stunting the dreams of private aerospace companies before they
even start, or (2) only state actors, allowing for wide private-sector development
in outer space.
In recent years, academics have debated how to interpret Article II of the
Outer Space Treaty. The broad interpretation argues that Article II governs all
actors, private and state, thus prohibiting all forms of appropriation in outer
space.24 Scholars advocating for a narrow interpretation of the Outer Space
Treaty argue that because Article II is silent as to private actors and only
addresses sovereign actors, there is no prohibition of private appropriation of
outer space resources.25 However, an examination through the lens of the plain
language of the text, taking into account the historical context at the time the
treaty was drafted, the argument for a narrow interpretation raises further
conflict. Sovereign recognition of ownership is essential to private ownership of
something in outer space.26 Private ownership of something cannot exist without
19

Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11.
Id.
21
See Bryon Brittingham, Does the World Really Need New Space Law?, 12 OR. REV. INT’L L. 31, 37
(2010); Sarah Coffey, Establishing a Legal Framework for Property Rights to Natural Resources in Outer Space,
41 CASE W. RESERVE J. INT’L L. 119, 125-26 (2009); John Myers, Comment, Extraterrestrial Property Rights:
Utilizing the Resources of the Final Frontier, 18 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 77, 94 (2016); Alexander William Salter,
Ordering the Cosmos: Private Law and Celestial Property Rights, 82 J. AIR L. & COM. 311, 312 (2017).
22
See Kleiman, supra note 18.
23
See id.
24
See FABIO TRONCHETTI, Legal Aspects of Space Resource Utilization, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW
769, 779–81 (Frans von der Dunk ed., 2015); Jijo George Cherian & Job Abraham, Concept of Private Property
in Space – An Analysis, 2 J. INT’L COMM. L. & TECH. 211, 213 (2007).
25
Alan Wasser & Douglas Jobes, Space Settlements, Property Rights, and International Law: Could a
Lunar Settlement Claim the Lunar Real Estate It Needs to Survive, 73 J. AIR L. & COM. 37, 44–45 (2008).
26
Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 371 (1954).
20
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first being granted by a sovereign,27 therefore a narrow interpretation of Article
II fails because it rests on the creation of an illegal property right over celestial
resources by private entities.
This Comment argues for a broad interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty
and urges a change in the international regulatory regime allowing the SPACE
Act of 2015 to operate without violating international treaty law. Recognizing
that property ownership flows from sovereign recognition and that private
ownership of something requires a state to reinforce this recognition, the Treaty,
through its language in Article II, should apply to all actors, state and private. A
proper textual interpretation of the treaty shows that the drafters intended for the
non-appropriation doctrine to cover all entities: private and state. Methods of
treaty interpretation, its travaux préparatoires, and a historical analysis of global
culture at the time of the treaty’s drafting and ratification supports this stance.
As written, the Outer Space Treaty prohibits both state and private exploitation
and appropriation of outer space resources. By allowing private appropriation in
outer space, the United States, through the SPACE Act of 2015, is committing a
prohibited act of sovereignty within the scope of Article II of the Treaty, thus
creating a conflict that may invalidate the U.S. law.
Resolving this dissonance requires a shift in international law or recognized
property regimes of private appropriation of celestial resources without violating
the Outer Space Treaty. A natural extension of any discussion of outer space
appropriation is a discussion of specific international property regimes
analogous to outer space, including the law of the high seas and Antarctica. That
discussion is beyond the scope of this Comment. Further, this Comment does
not address the legal status of states that have not signed the Outer Space Treaty,
or citizens of states that have not signed the Treaty.
This Comment, in Part II, outlines the history and relevant text of both the
Outer Space Treaty and the SPACE Act of 2015, examining both legislative
history and the global context of their drafting. Part III defines and applies the
three most widely-accepted methods of treaty interpretation to the Outer Space
Treaty. Part IV compares the methods of treaty interpretation and demonstrates
how they support the conclusion that a broad interpretation of the Outer Space
Treaty is most proper. Part V addresses how a narrow interpretation of the Treaty
conflicts with its text. The final section will propose that the SPACE Act of
2015, as currently written, is invalid as against the Outer Space Treaty, and will

27

Id.

TAYLORCOMMENTPROOFS_6.5.19

658

6/5/2019 11:15 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

explore potential solutions that could resolve the dissonance between the Treaty
and the Act.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. History and Text of the Outer Space Treaty
The origins of international space law are traceable to the 1957 creation of
the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS).28 Primarily established in response to the Soviet Union’s successful
launch of Sputnik-1, the formation of the committee was unprecedented, as it
created an entire new field of public international law: the law of outer space.29
In what scholar Frans von der Dunk refers to as three phases, COPUOS
developed juris spatialis internationalis by drafting five treaties governing the
various aspects of human interaction with outer space.30 Only two of those
treaties, the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty, address property rights.31
In its first phase, the committee produced little that was legally binding.32 Of
particular interest is a draft called the Principles Declaration, which is the
skeleton of what became the Outer Space Treaty.33 The second phase saw more
substantial development, as the committee converted the Principles Declaration
into the Outer Space Treaty, receiving wide acceptance and enjoying the
signature of 107 states to date.34 The third phase of COPUOS is characterized as
a return to the development of international space law through non-binding
resolutions, much as it did in phase one.35 On January 27, 1967, the Outer Space

28

NATHAN V. GOLDMAN, AMERICAN SPACE LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC 23 (1996).
PETER JANKOWITSCH, The Background and History of Space Law, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 1, 5
(Frans von der Dunk ed., 2015).
30
See id. at 26; VON DER DUNK, supra note 18, at 37 (The other four treaties that came out of COPUOUS
are The Rescue Agreement, the Liability Convention, the Registration Convention, and the Moon Agreement.);
JANKOWITSCH, supra note 29, at 12.
31
See VON DER DUNK, supra note 18, at 99–100 (The Moon Agreement has received wide criticism for
its broad international jurisdiction over outer space, which is apparent in the fact that only seventeen states have
ratified it, none of them being space-faring nations, including the United States.); United Nations Office for
Disarmament Affairs, supra note 16; Taylor R. Dalton, Developing the Final Frontier: Defining Private
Property Rights on Celestial bodies for the Benefit of All Mankind 11 (Cornell L. Sch. Graduate Student Papers,
Paper No. 25, 2010), http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1041&context=lps_papers.
32
VON DER DUNK, supra note 18, at 38.
33
Id. at 39.
34
Id.; see United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, supra note 16.
35
VON DER DUNK, supra note 18, at 41.
29
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Treaty was opened for signature, and it has currently been ratified by over one
hundred states, including all space-faring nations.36
The Outer Space Treaty very clearly outlines the principles that were
important to its drafters and the international community at the time of its
creation. With a focus on regulating the use of outer space, it contains several
important stances including a prohibition on the use of weapons of mass
destruction in outer space, the requirement that celestial exploration be for the
benefit of countries as “the province of all mankind,” and the requirement that
states aid all astronauts and regulate jurisdiction over their space objects.37
Most controversial, however, is the Article II prohibition on the
appropriation of outer space. Article II concisely states: “Outer space, including
the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by
claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”38
Article I provides an important backdrop about equality among states and
opportunity to explore upon which the drafters’ intent in Article II can best be
understood:
The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other
celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests
of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific
development, and shall be the province of all mankind. Outer space,
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for
exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind,
on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and
there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies. There shall be
freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, including the Moon
and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage
international cooperation in such investigation.39

The idea that outer space should be a province for equal use among all
countries in cooperation with one another is prevalent. The drafters express this
intention explicitly in Article I, and it works in the background throughout the
entirety of the Treaty by creating a tone against unfair advantage among
countries.

36
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11; Comm. On the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal
Subcomm. on Its Fifty-Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2015/CRP.8 (2015); United Nations Office for
Disarmament Affairs, supra note 16.
37
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11.
38
Id.
39
Id.
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Article VI echoes that tone specifically with regard to state control and
responsibility for anything they do or place in outer space. The Article puts a
significant “international responsibility” on states for the “national activities”
they carry out in outer space.40 It imposes that responsibility not only on states
themselves, but also, by extension, to non-sovereign entities by requiring states
to ensure that activities “carried on by governmental agencies or by nongovernmental entities . . . are carried out in conformity with the provisions set
forth in the present Treaty.”41 Therefore, the Treaty clearly, in Article VI,
contemplates private actors and firmly places their activities within the
jurisdiction and responsibility of the state of which they are citizens. The Article
further requires sponsoring states to “authoriz[e] and [provide] continuing
supervision” over the activities of non-sovereign entities in outer space.42 It is
apparent by the early language of the Treaty that preserving outer space for
peaceful, non-territorial uses—by states or private entities—is important to its
drafters, and that intent has express incorporation into the text itself.
The Outer Space Treaty has been used as a basis for subsequent international
agreements, perhaps the most well-known of which is the Agreement Governing
the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Treaty).43
The Moon Treaty built upon the language of the Outer Space Treaty by adding
that “the moon shall be used . . . exclusively for peaceful purposes,” and
mandates that states “shall take measures to prevent the disruption of the existing
balance of [the] environment”.44
While it does not directly adopt the principal purpose of the Outer Space
Treaty, the Moon Treaty takes things a step further and asserts that celestial
resources are the “common heritage of mankind,” thereby adopting an
international law common heritage approach to outer space.45 This common
heritage approach to international space law rests on five tenets: (1) there is an
absolute bar on both private and state appropriation of celestial resources in outer
space; (2) celestial resources are for the benefit of all states and every state
should manage and care for them; (3) because celestial resources are for the
benefit of all states, any benefit a state attains must be shared with all other

40
41
42
43
44
45

Id.
Id.
Id.
G.A. Res. 34/68 (Dec. 5, 1979).
Id.
Id.
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states; (4) outer space may not be used for military purposes; and (5) outer space
must be preserved by states for future generations.46
The common heritage approach adopted by the Moon Treaty is very
controversial as evinced by the fact that it has the signature of only two spacefaring states.47 Developing nations, especially those without the means or ability
to explore outer space, are supportive of the Moon Treaty and its common
heritage effect.48 The largest issue with the Moon Treaty is element (3)—that
celestial resources are for the benefit of all states and should be shared with all
other states.49 Although signed by relatively few states, the purpose behind the
passage of the Moon Treaty and its provisions that bar property rights in outer
space echo and support the same purpose of the earlier Outer Space Treaty.
Through passage of the Moon Treaty, the international community once again
expressed its desire for complete non-appropriation of planets and celestial
resources.
B. History and Text of the SPACE Act of 2015
In the fifty years following the drafting of the Outer Space Treaty, the United
States has found itself in a very different space-faring world than it did in 1967.
Private American companies with big aspirations of celestial travel and
exploitation have the money, the ideas, and the technology; they just need the
legal backing.
The United States’ response to these growing needs was by way of House
Bill 1508, a proposed act that specifically addressed United States citizen
exploitation and ownership of asteroid resources.50 The proposed act was headed
by the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology with the intent to
“establish a legal framework to govern property rights of resources obtained
from asteroids enabling this new industry and providing clarity for future
entrepreneurs.”51 Among other components, the bill would enable the President
to “promote the right of United States commercial entities to explore outer space
and utilize space resources, in accordance with the existing international
46

See id.
See Brittingham, supra note 21, at 38. (The only space-faring states that have signed the Moon Treaty
are France and India). See Nuclear Threat Initiative, Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Agreement), NTI (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-andregimes/agreement-governing-activities-states-moon-and-other-celestial-bodies-moon-agreement.
48
See id. at 39.
49
G.A. Res. 34/68 (Dec. 5, 1979).
50
H.R. 1508, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015).
51
H.R. Rep. No. 114-153, at 3 (2015).
47

TAYLORCOMMENTPROOFS_6.5.19

662

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

6/5/2019 11:15 AM

[Vol. 33

obligations of the United States, free from harmful interference, and to transfer
or sell such resources.”52
Many problems with the proposed bill were raised early on.53 While still in
debate on the House floor, Representative Donna Edwards of Maryland pointed
out the non-appropriation conflict between the proposed bill and the Outer Space
Treaty.54 She asserted that the bill would undoubtedly run into this conflict if
passed, and recommended more hearings to flesh the conflict out.55 Relying on
the act of sovereignty theory, Representative Edwards also addressed the
temporal concern that the bill was premature in that it would allow the new
aerospace industry an essentially “regulation free” opportunity to work without
specific safety requirements, thereby not requiring any industry standards to be
implemented.56 The act of sovereignty theory that Representative Edwards was
referring to is the idea that private appropriation of outer space resources
constitutes an act of sovereignty because property rights are granted by states.57
Skepticism and resistance persisted during the Committee consideration
stage by the minority-view leaders.58 They claimed that there seemed to be a
conflict between the proposed bill and the Outer Space Treaty.59 Relying on an
opinion submitted by Professor Joanne Gabrynowicz of the University of
Mississippi Law School, the minority argued that inclusion of the phrase:
“consistence with the existing international obligations of the United States,” did
not automatically resolve the international conflicts it posed.60
The minority-view advanced three other points of conflict. First, on the
counsel of Professor Gabrynowicz, they identified that the bill lacked any system
of licensing for these outer space endeavors,61 resulting in many practical
problems. Second, the minority took issue with the language: “obtain[ed] such
resources,” claiming that such language implies asserting territorial sovereign
property rights over celestial bodies—something that is prohibited by the Outer

52

H.R. 1508, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015).
See 161 Cong. Rec. H3513 (daily ed. May 21, 2015) (letter from Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz submitted
for the record by Rep. Edwards).
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
161 Cong. Rec. H3512-14 (daily ed. May 21, 2015) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
57
See 161 Cong. Rec. H3513 (daily ed. May 21, 2015) (letter from Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz submitted
for the record by Rep. Edwards).
58
H.R. Rep. No. 114-153, at 20 (2015).
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 15.
53
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Space Treaty.62 Finally, it was pointed out by the minority that they were
unaware of any United States agency supportive of the bill.63
The majority-view eventually won out, even though the Act has “no
licensing regime to govern the activities undertaken in the bill.”64 The bill is
important, if for no other reason, because it is the first of its kind to take property
rights in outer space under real scrutiny, and it is timely because of the growing
private space technology industries. There was clearly a push from the majorityview for passage of the bill without a great deal of specific licensing and
regulation for fear that it would unnecessarily stamper the work of the new
private aerospace industry.
House Bill 1508 was eventually incorporated into the SPACE Act of 2015.65
The House of Representatives passed the act by a 284 to 133 margin, and the
Senate passed it on November 10, 2015.66 President Obama signed it into law
on November 25, 2015.67
In its final form, the Act outlines property rights United States citizens may
have over space resources:
A United States citizen engaged in commercial recovery of an
asteroid resource or space resource under this chapter shall be entitled
to any asteroid resources or space resources obtained, including to
possess, own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid resource or space
resource obtained in accordance with applicable law, including the
international obligations of the United States.68

There is much scholarly discussion about the purpose and intent behind the
United States’ passage of the Space Act of 2015 in the first place, especially
considering the apparent conflicts the minority-view highlighted during the
bill’s consideration.69 Some suggest that the theory of pedis possessio is the
principal force behind the statute, especially considering the language about

62

Id. at 21.
Id.
64
Id.
65
H.R. 2262, 114th Cong. (2015).
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship Act, Pub. L. No. 114-19, 129 Stat.
704 (2015).
69
Thomas J. Herron, Note, Student Note: Deep Space Thinking: What Elon Musk’s Idea to Nuke Mars
Teaches U About Regulating the “Visionaries and Daredevils” of Outer Space, 41 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 553,
592 (2016).
63
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recovering celestial resources “free from harmful interference.”70 Pedis
possessio is the idea “that citizens should have the right to explore for and
recover space resources ‘free from harmful interference.’”71 Suggestive of open
freedom to claim property rights over any celestial resource that a United States
citizen takes in outer space, pedis possessio offers insight into a possible
aspiration of free claim over outer space, which the United States may be
pushing for.72
Others claim that the United States’ intent with the Space Act of 2015 is not
to claim the type of appropriation prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty, but
instead to exercise regulatory jurisdiction over in-situ resources its citizens
appropriate in outer space.73 Under this argument, states themselves do not
appropriate celestial resources, but instead merely regulate the resources
appropriated by their citizens.74 The argument further claims that because states
have jurisdiction over objects they send into outer space, they can validly
regulate those endeavors.75 Because states can regulate such endeavors, they
may regulate private projects to exploit in-situ celestial resources without
“appropriating” the outer space territory from which they were taken.76 It is
possible to infer from the language in the SPACE Act of 2015 that the United
States believes the appropriation it authorizes by the Act is not really
“appropriation,” but is instead merely a way to establish a regulatory jurisdiction
over in-situ celestial resources.77
Thus, the purpose behind the passage of the SPACE Act of 2015 is less clear
than the purpose articulated by the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty.
Nonetheless, the history of both lead to text that is open to interpretation.
II. METHODS OF TREATY INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION
Much like statutes, treaties are subject to interpretation after their drafting
and entry into force—especially in instances of ambiguity or confusion as to

70

See id.
Craig Foster, Excuse Me, You’re Mining My Asteroid: Space Property Rights and the U.S. Space
Resource Exploration and Utilization Act of 2015, U. ILL. J.L. TECH & POL’Y 407, 421 (2016) (citing Space
Resource Exploration and Utilization Act of 2015 § 402 (codified as amended at 51 U.S.C. § 51302(a)(3)
(2015)); see also H.R. Rep. No. 114-153, 2015)).
72
Id.
73
See Herron, supra note 69, at 595.
74
Id.
75
See id. (noting that national governments retain jurisdiction over items sent into outer space).
76
Id.
77
Id. at 596.
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their effects.78 “The purpose of interpretation is to establish the meaning of the
text” and apply it to a real problem.79 Treaty interpretation is almost always
based on the guidelines set forth in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (Vienna Convention),80 which has wide acceptance with 116 state
parties to it.81 Even though the United States is a not a party to the Convention,
the United States recognizes almost all of the Convention’s provisions as
binding customary international law and thus acknowledges its authority.82 The
Vienna Convention specifically outlines three methods of treaty interpretation:
(a) the textualist approach, (b) the intentionalist approach, and (c) the
teleological approach.83
The textualist—or literal—approach to treaty interpretation has its roots in
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.84 It states: “[a] treaty shall be interpreted
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”85 The
textualist approach, therefore, contains three elements: (i) treaty interpretation
should always be in good faith,86 (ii) the terms of a treaty should be given their
ordinary meaning, unless doing so “results in a meaning incompatible with the
spirit, purpose and context of the clause or instrument in which the words are
contained,”87 and (iii) context determines a treaty’s ordinary meaning, taking
into consideration its object and purpose.88 The textualist approach is, therefore,
the basic, step-one rule of treaty interpretation. Only if a textualist analysis leads
to a “‘manifestly absurd or unreasonable’ result,” or if the text itself is
“ambiguous or obscure[,]” should one turn to secondary methods of
interpretation.89

78
LASSA F. L. OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1272 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts
eds., 9th ed. 2008).
79
Id at 1271.
80
DAVID J. BEDERMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: A HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 21 (2003).
81
UNITED NATIONS, STATUS OF TREATIES, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en (last visited Oct. 26, 2017).
82
BEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 81, at 18.
83
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
84
OPPENHEIM, supra note 79, at 1271.
85
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 84, at 340.
86
OPPENHEIM, supra note 79, at 1272.
87
Id. (quoting South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. 315,
336 (Dec. 21)).
88
Id. at 1273.
89
BEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 81, at 22–23 (quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra
note 83, at 340).
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The broad text in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty provides an ordinary
and unambiguous meaning free from absurdity.90 The language of Article II is
short: “[o]uter space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not
subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or
occupation, or by any other means.”91 At first glance, the language clearly
intends to bar ownership over all aspects of outer space, with the only wrinkle
of confusion being the meaning of “national appropriation.” Stephen Gorove, a
space law expert, has suggested it is better to first define appropriation before
determining how “national” modifies the term.92 Broadly, appropriation is “the
taking of property for one’s own or exclusive use with a sense of permanence.”93
In this regard, appropriation is of a “national” character when it is by an entity
under the sovereignty of the state from which they come or represent.94 Even
though Article II uses the “national” language, its ordinary meaning is most
closely linked to all sovereignties and the individuals and entities that attain
property rights under the authority of a sovereign.
A separate insight of classic legal realism logically lends itself to the same
conclusion. For an individual to hold property rights in something, the
government must legally recognize the property rights.95 The language of Article
II bars governments from recognizing property interests in outer space for
themselves. Because individuals and private entities cannot hold property rights
in something without recognition from a sovereign that it will protect their
rights, a correct interpretation of the language of Article II should bar the ability
of private entities and individuals to appropriate rights over celestial resources
as well. If a state recognizes a property right held by an individual over a celestial
body or resource, such recognition would constitute a form of national
appropriation because it is essentially “a de facto exclusion of other states and
their nationals” to that body or resource.96 The text of Article II naturally leads

90

Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11.
Id.
92
See Stephen Gorove, Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 349, 352
(1969) (“With respect to the concept of appropriation the basic question is what constitutes ‘appropriation,’ as
used in the Treaty, especially in contradistinction to casual or temporary use.”).
93
Id.
94
See id. (“Under such interpretation the establishment of a permeant settlement or the carrying out of
commercial activities by nationals of a country on a celestial body may constitute national appropriation if the
activities take place under the supreme authority (sovereignty) of the state.”).
95
See Cohen, supra note 26, at 374 (“[P]roperty [is that] to which the following label can be attached: To
the world: / Keep off X unless you have my permission, which I may grant or withhold. / Signed: Private citizen
/ Endorsed: The state”).
96
Leslie I. Tennen, Towards a New Regime for Exploitation of Outer Space Mineral Resources, 88 NEB.
L. REV. 794, 805 (2010).
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to the conclusion that its non-appropriation language is binding on all actors—
state and private.
A. Intentionalist Approach
The second method of treaty interpretation, the intentionalist approach,
governs when a textualist analysis “[l]eaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure”
or “[l]eads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”97 Grounded
in Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, this approach seeks to interpret a treaty
in the way most closely aligned with the intent of its drafters.98 The intentionalist
analysis involves looking to other sources to ascertain the drafters’ intent
through context, such as a treaty’s travaux préparatoires.99 Travaux
préparatoires are “[m]aterials used in preparing the ultimate form of an
agreement or statute, and especially of an international treaty; the draft or
legislative history of a treaty.”100 “Context,” as defined in the Vienna
Convention, includes “[a]ny agreement relating to the treaty which was made
between all the parties in connexion [sic] with the conclusion of the treaty” and
“[a]ny instrument . . . made by one or more parties . . . and accepted by the other
parties.”101
In this case, because the textualist approach does not lead to an obscure or
ambiguous meaning regarding Article II, further interpretation is not necessary.
Nonetheless, an analysis of the intent of its drafters further supports the same
conclusion. The Outer Space Treaty began as General Assembly Resolution
1148 of November 14, 1957.102 Resolution 1148 is aimed at preventing means
of war and mass destruction by “decreasing the danger of war and improving the
prospects of a durable peace through achieving international agreement on
reduction, limitation and open inspection of armaments and armed forces.”103
The Resolution further extends its rationale of peace to the prospects of outer
space, claiming that outer space “shall be exclusively for peaceful and scientific
purposes.”104

97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 84, at 340.
BEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 81, at 21–22.
Id. at 22.
Travaux Pr. . .paratoires, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 83, at 340.
G.A. Res. 1148 (XII), at 3 (Nov. 14, 1957).
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
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After the creation of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space by
the General Assembly adoption of Resolution 1472,105 two internal committees
were established for legal and scientific questions, respectively.106 The
subcommittee for legal questions saw draft opinions on Resolution 1148 from
the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Arab.107 The proposal
submitted by the Soviet Union is the first containing a clause about property
rights, stating: “Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use
by all States; no State may claim sovereignty over outer space or celestial
bodies.”108 The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space did not agree
on the proposal submitted to the legal subcommittee, so the matter went up to
the General Assembly for discussion.109
The General Assembly later adopted Resolution 1962, which includes the
language: “Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by
all states,” and “Outer space and celestial bodies are not subject to national
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any
other means.”110
During negotiation of the Outer Space Treaty, the French delegation raised
the question of exactly how “use” should be construed.111 Specifically, there was
a question about whether “use” means mere exploration or if it contemplates
actual exploitation of celestial resources.112 The Soviet delegation replied, in
part, that the committee should not “attempt to prescribe rules for situations on
which it [is] impossible to form adequate judgement at the present stage.”113 The
Generally Assembly adopted Resolution 2222 as the Outer Space Treaty in its
twenty-first session,114 leaving virtually no travaux relating to property rights in
Outer Space. Regardless, it is clear from the early documents and debates that
inspired the Outer Space Treaty that a few things were always important to the
drafters: peaceful use, scientific exploration, and non-appropriation.

105

G.A. Res. 1472 (XIV), at 5 (Dec. 12, 1959).
Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, on Its Seventeenth Session, U.N. Doc. A/5181 (1962).
107
Id. 7–9.
108
Id. at 8.
109
Id. at 3.
110
G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), at 1 (Dec. 13, 1963).
111
Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcomm. on its Fifth Session, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/C.2/SR.63 (Oct. 20, 1966).
112
Id.
113
Id. at 11.
114
G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI) (Dec. 19, 1966).
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B. Teleological Approach
The third method of treaty interpretation is the teleological approach—also
called purposivism—which endeavors to interpret a treaty in the way most in
line with its purpose, rather than following the ordinary meaning of its text or
ascertaining the intent of its drafters.115 The goal of a teleological analysis is to
“give[] scope to the fundamental reason or problem [the treaty] was supposed to
address.”116 The teleological approach is rooted in Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention, which requires treaties to be interpreted in light of their “object and
purpose” while also adhering to “relevant rules of international law.”117 The
“object and purpose” of a treaty is a broad phrase referring to a “treaty’s goals
and the character of the means employed to achieve them.”118
Examining the era in which the Outer Space Treaty was drafted highlights
its purpose. As briefly mentioned in Part I,119 it would be a mistake to analyze
the Outer Space Treaty today without appreciating the events of the world at the
time of its drafting and entry into force. The Soviet Union’s successful launch
of Sputnik-1 took the globe by surprise and led to American apprehension about
its Cold War rival.120 Specifically, there was fear that this new access to outer
space would encourage a nuclear war.121 It can also be said that the United States
was worried that the Soviet Union was getting ahead of it with regard to
scientific developments.122 The current form of, and signatories to, the Outer
Space Treaty suggests that other countries were likely just as concerned.123
These concerns of impending war and a “space race” of countries to
potentially claim territory in outer space is explicit in the language of the Treaty.
As Johnathan Galloway analogizes to game theory, two Cold War rivals were
involved in a zero-sum conflict where one would come out on top, or a nonzero-sum situation where the two countries would eventually work together to
achieve a purpose for the use of outer space that the entire globe could benefit
from.124
115

BEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 81, at 23.
Id.
117
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 84.
118
David S. Jonas & Thomas N. Saunders, The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three Interpretive
Methods, 43 VAND. J. TRANSACTIONAL L. 565, 580 (2010).
119
See discussion supra Part I.
120
Kleiman, supra note 18; VON DER DUNK, supra note 18, at 36, 44.
121
Jonathan F. Galloway, Revolution and Evolution in the Law of Outer Space, 87 NEB. L. REV. 516, 516
(2008).
122
Id. at 516–17.
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United Nations Office for Disarmanent Affaira, supra note 16.
124
Id. at 517.
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The most relevant Articles in the Outer Space Treaty confirm it was the
second purpose—a peaceful use of outer space for the benefit of all—that won
out. The application of the Article II non-appropriation doctrine properly applies
to all actors, state and private. This conclusion most significantly supports the
underlying historical purpose the time of the Treaty’s drafting reflects, and the
global problems and threats it was intended to respond to.
Although all three forms of interpretation do, to varying degrees, support a
conclusion that the non-appropriation doctrine of Article II prohibits all forms
of celestial ownership (state and private), the textualist approach most strongly
supports it. The argument is especially strong given the Vienna Convention’s
requirement that treaty interpretation always start with the ordinary meaning of
its text.125 As concluded in Part III,126 a textualist analysis of Article II of the
Treaty leads to a finding that its language covers all actors, private and state.
Further, the secondary forms of interpretation, intentionalist and teleological,
support this conclusion as well. A finding that the Outer Space Treaty covers all
actors is a result that does not conflict with the spirit, purpose, or context of the
text when examined alongside secondary methods such as travaux and a
historical examination of the global events at the time of the Treaty’s drafting.
Combined, this reflects an object and purpose of the Treaty that naturally leads
to a conclusion that its non-appropriation effect should be binding on all actors.
III. THE CASE FOR A BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY
Even beyond formal modes of treaty interpretation, an argument also exists
for the use of canons of construction to support this stance.
A. Other Methods of Interpretation: Expressio unius est exclusion alterius
Expressio unius est exclusion alterius is a widely accepted international
canon of interpretation.127 It states that when interpreting international materials,
one should presume things not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice,
not inadvertence.128 Defined as “[a] canon of construction holding that to express
or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative,”129
the canon can theoretically be applied to support the conclusion that the Outer

125

See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 84.
See discussion supra Part III.
127
See Charlie Stewart, The Rhetoric Canons of Construction: New Textualism’s Rhetoric Problem, 116
MICH. LAW. REV. 1485, 1495 (2018).
128
Wasser & Jobes, supra note 26, at 47.
129
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 101.
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Space Treaty does indeed prohibit the appropriation of celestial resources by
both state and private actors.
At the time of the Treaty’s drafting, in the 1960s, only state actors were
interested in outer space endeavors; it was far beyond the realm of possibility
for the drafters to even imagine the technological advancements and
privatization of space interests that have since occurred. Through the treaty, the
drafters were speaking only to the audience to whom it would apply: sovereigns.
If the drafters intended for private actors to be governed differently, expressio
unius could be applied negatively to support that they would have explicitly
addressed this in the Treaty.130 Because Article II of the Treaty addresses a
specific issue (non-appropriation of celestial resources and bodies) within the
context of every actor to which it applied at the time of its drafting (state actors
only), the canon should apply to say if the drafters wanted any interested entity
to be excluded from the Treaty’s non-appropriation effect, they would have
expressly stated so in the text, thus drastically altering its literal interpretation.
IV. A NARROW INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY CONFLICTS WITH THE TEXT
A. Silence as to Private Actors
A narrow interpretation of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, concluding
that it applies to state actors only, conflicts with the text. The argument for a
narrow interpretation rests on the conclusion that because the Treaty does not
address property rights per se, there is no prohibition against private
appropriation of celestial resources.131 Some scholars extend this argument to
say that because the Treaty only addresses appropriation by a sovereign, it is not
binding on private appropriation of celestial resources, therefore allowing legal
ownership over any part of outer space by an individual or private
organization.132

130
Indeed, it is not clear that the doctrine expressio unius is typically used negatively in this way. The
doctrine could be, and has been, used to suggest that the drafters’ failure to mention private actors was instead
deliberate, and therefore, the treaty does not apply to private actors. See Wasser & Jobes, supra note 26, at 47;
Brittingham, supra note 21, at 36. However, a negative use, taking the doctrine a step further, does support the
conclusion that the Treaty should be applied broadly and actually aligns most closely with the actual text and
ordinary meaning of the Treaty.
131
See Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, The International Space Treaty Regime in the Globalization Era, AD
ASTRA, Fall 2005, at 30, http://www.space-settlement-institute.org/Articles/IntlSpaceTreatyGabryno.pdf.
132
See id.; P.J. Blount & Christian J. Robison, One Small Step: The Impact of the U.S. Commercial Space
Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 on the Exploitation of Resources in Outer Space, 18 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 160,
165 (2016); Wasser & Jobes, supra note 26, at 46.
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While attractive, this argument fails to recognize the authority of the Vienna
Convention; treaty interpretation must start with the text of the treaty and not an
analysis of its drafters’ perceived intent.133 Only if such a textualist analysis
yields a result that conflicts with the spirit, purpose, or context of the text should
one turn to secondary methods of interpretation. This argument skips an
important step in the analytical process by overlooking the textualist
interpretation of the Treaty. A textualist interpretation, as examined in Part III,134
supports a broad application of the non-appropriation doctrine.
B. Jurisdictional Control
Scholars also advance an argument that the Treaty bars states from
appropriating territorial sovereignty over celestial resources, but allows for a
“functional” property right—a jurisdictional control—over objects and persons,
and by virtue of that, the celestial land to which it is attached for the time it is
attached.135 The argument here is grounded in Article VIII of the Outer Space
Treaty, which is said to confer the “functional” property right.136
The problem with this argument is that it conflates jurisdictional control with
true property rights. The treaty does allow jurisdictional control over objects
(equipment sent into space, for instance), but it does not “prescribe a system in
which jurisdictional control can be used to establish real property rights.”137
Therefore, this “functional” property right argument fails to establish a
framework for valid appropriation of celestial resources under the Outer Space
Treaty, and cannot, by extension, protect the SPACE Act of 2015.

133

OPPENHEIM, supra note 79, at 1271.
See discussion supra Part III.
135
See Wayne N. White, Real Property Rights in Outer Space, Proceedings, 40th Colloquium on the Law
of Outer Space, 1998, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, http://www.spacefuture.com/
archive/real_property_rights_in_outer_space.shtml; Dalton, supra note 31, at 14.
136
Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty states: “A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object
launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any personnel
thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body. Ownership of objects launched into outer space, including
objects landed or constructed on a celestial body, and of their component parts, is not affected by their presence
in outer space or on a celestial body or by their return to the Earth. Such objects or component parts found
beyond the limits of the State Party to the Treaty on whose registry they are carried shall be returned to that State
Party, which shall, upon request, furnish identifying data prior to their return.” Outer Space Treaty, supra note
11.
137
Andrew R. Brehm, Note & Comment, Private Property in Outer Space: Establishing a Foundation for
Future Exploration, 33 WIS. INT’L L.J. 353, 360 (2015).
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C. Practical Concerns: Government Force
Another argument some scholars advocate for is that the United States is
asserting its intentions with the passage of the SPACE Act of 2015 without any
regard to the Outer Space Treaty through hegemony.138 If the international
community allows countries to pass domestic laws like the United States SPACE
Act of 2015, it is allowing those countries to completely disregard the Outer
Space Treaty and instead engage in hegemony. This is essentially a “so what”
approach where a country uses its military power and international authority to
exercise dominance over an outer space resource to the exclusion of all other
countries, and without regard to the Outer Space Treaty.139 As Alfred McCoy
points out, such international displays of hegemonic power are not a new
practice of the United States,140 and it is likely that the United States intends the
passage of the SPACE Act of 2015 to be one of these displays.141 The biggest
problem with this perspective is that it does not really resolve the dissonance
between the Treaty and the Act at all, but simply ignores it. It also seems unlikely
that the international community will accept this kind of dominion over outer
space resources by one or a few countries without forceful opposition by other
states.
Moving forward, it makes most sense for the current international regime
against appropriation of outer space resources to control for reasons that go
beyond international norms of treaty law. First, as previously discussed, there is
a risk of hegemony over outer space resources if the United States protects its
citizens’ appropriation. Further, the risk of hegemony and its potential for abuse
goes against the purpose of the original Outer Space Treaty itself. It is apparent
that concerns about ensuring international cooperation and agreement over outer
space in its entirety was important to the drafters. In addition, the drafters were
very specific in their desire for outer space to be the province of all humankind
for scientific use and other peaceful purposes.142 Allowing the United States to
continue its apparent path of appropriation through hegemony goes directly
against the purpose of the Outer Space Treaty. It, by its very definition, gives
only countries—like the United States—first dibs, and therefore the rights to

138
See Alison Morris, Note, Intergalactic Property Law: A New Regime for a New Age, 19 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 1085, 1088, 1102 (2017).
139
See Id. at 1102–05.
140
See Alfred W. McCoy, You Must Follow International Law (Unless You’re America), THE NATION
(Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/you-must-follow-international-law-unless-youre-america/.
141
Morris, supra note 139, at 1102.
142
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11.
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claim ownership over outer space resources simply because they have the means
to get there.
In a theoretical world where the Outer Space Treaty does not continue to
control, consequences of a space race to claim as many celestial resources as
possible is likely to ensue. Without the Outer Space Treaty, countries are
essentially free to use outer space in any way they wish without giving any
regard to other countries or the celestial resources themselves. For instance, a
country could mount a nuclear weapon on the moon or dump its nuclear waste
in outer space without facing any real repercussions for doing so. It is necessary
to have some kind of instrument to govern the use of outer space. If the Outer
Space Treaty does not continue to control, then another treaty or instrument is
necessary to ensure the safety and ecological impact of using outer space.
Clearly, private development in outer space has the potential to be very
desirable, as companies like SpaceX and Moon Express are currently
demonstrating.143 The resources available in outer space are essentially limitless,
and their development has extremely profitable potential.144 While the current
international regime under the Outer Space Treaty does not allow for such
private development through appropriation, either a different treaty or an
international agency could replace the Outer Space Treaty to attain those
aspirations. A different treaty could achieve everything that was important to the
drafters of the Outer Space Treaty and simply alter the language prohibiting
appropriation, but only if such appropriation is peaceful in nature.
The establishment of an international agency to regulate appropriation and
use of celestial resources is another strong option.145 A compromise using an
agency like this is the result of “intergovernmental agreements, clear legal
structure, joint funding, coordinated technology, and a limited self-interested
body independent of the United Nations.”146 The International Space Station is
an example of an international agency like this that has seen great success as a
shared entity between multiple states.147
Concerns about what may happen if the Treaty continues to control and the
United States disregards it, or if the Treaty should not control at all in the future,
really come down to whether it is best to allow private appropriation of celestial

143
144
145
146
147

See Baidawi & Chang, supra note 3; FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 6.
Id.
Morris, supra note 139, at 1106–07.
Id. at 1106.
See Morris, supra note 139, at 1107.
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resources. If it is, the current international regime governing celestial
appropriation in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty should face a complete
overturn or replacement by a new treaty or international agency. Regardless,
appropriation of any kind in outer space should not be mandated by national
hegemons, but instead by a clear international regime agreed to by space-faring
states that respects equality and ecological fairness.
CONCLUSION
The Outer Space Treaty is the principal treaty that regulates international
endeavors in outer space, and it specifically prohibits appropriation of outer
space resources and bodies. This conclusion finds support not only through the
three most widely-accepted methods of treaty interpretation, but also through
canons of construction and practical concerns.
A textualist interpretation that supports a broad application of Article II is
most proper. And even through analysis using secondary methods of
interpretation (intentionalist or teleological interpretations), the textualist result
still prevails. A broad interpretation of the Treaty remains most true to the spirit
of the text, and is most consistent with its travaux and the state of technology
and global events at the time of its drafting.
The world today is very different than it was fifty years ago when the Outer
Space Treaty emerged. American companies like SpaceX and Moon Express
have shown the desirability that private development of outer space may have,
and demonstrate that such development might be highly valuable in the future.148
Through the SPACE Act of 2015, the United States recognizes this and is
attempting to make it easier for these companies to do the work they aim to
without significant interference.149 If it is desirable to allow appropriation of
outer space resources, the current international governing regime under the
Outer Space Treaty simply will not work. It clearly bars all forms of
appropriation; therefore, the creation of a new regime is necessary to support
those goals.
It is unlikely that such private development can occur without appropriating
celestial resources. If there is no change in international law to allow it—either
by a treaty or by the creation of an international agency—it is possible that some
countries will adopt a “so what” attitude and pass domestic laws, similar to the
SPACE Act of 2015, that support their own celestial endeavors through
148
149

See Baidawi & Chang, supra note 3; FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 6.
H.R. 2262, 114th Cong. (2015).

TAYLORCOMMENTPROOFS_6.5.19

676

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

6/5/2019 11:15 AM

[Vol. 33

hegemony, without any regard to other countries or the safety or ecological
stability of outer space. And if the Outer Space Treaty faces rejection without
replacement by a different governing instrument, there may be a great risk of a
race among countries to claim as many resources as they can in outer space.
Therefore, even if private development is most desirable and the international
community agrees to either alter or replace the non-appropriation effect of the
Outer Space Treaty, there must be some governing instrument or body to
regulate the use of outer space at the risk of things getting completely out of
hand.
There exists a direct counter-argument that Article II of the Outer Space
Treaty does not apply to private actors at all, only to state actors.150 This
argument rests primarily on the idea that a treaty is a kind of contract between
states that benefits their citizens but does not directly bind their citizens to
international obligations.151 However, the purpose behind the drafting of the
Treaty in the first place most logically stands for the conclusion that ensuring
safety and ecological standards in outer space has always been important.152
Allowing a loophole for private actors to essentially do whatever they want with
celestial resources and planetary bodies goes directly against the core purpose
of having such a treaty in the first place.
There is also a strong argument that the canon expressio unius can cut the
other way.153 Even though it is unlikely that the drafters of the Outer Space
Treaty contemplated private development in outer space, their failure to mention
private actors expresses a deliberate choice.154 Expressio unius, if applied
positively, says the treaty does not apply to private actors at all. However, if this
true, private actors technically have free reign to do essentially whatever they
want in outer space without any real international limits on that freedom.
Because the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty expressed concern with limiting
the power of states to appropriate and use outer space for self-interested gain,155
it is a stretch to say that the drafters would agree to allow private entities to do
the same. It is more sound that the canon should apply to say that if the drafters
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intend any entity, private or state, to be excepted from the Treaty’s bar on
appropriation, it would be directly expressed in the text of the treaty.
By its passage of the SPACE Act of 2015, the United States is implicitly
adopting a hegemonic approach to future appropriation of celestial resources.
The Act explicitly allows United States citizens to recover and own resources
extracted from celestial bodies,156 thus creating a property right. Passage of the
act is a signal that the United States, a sovereign, is creating and enforcing that
property right.
Because this creation of the property right deals with outer space and
celestial resources, it directly implicates the Outer Space Treaty, which in
Article II broadly rejects appropriation of any kind in outer space.157 The United
States’ creation of a property right that an international treaty directly governs
constitutes an act of sovereignty that is impermissible under the Outer Space
Treaty. Through its current language, the SPACE Act of 2015 creates an illegal
property right as against Article II of the Outer Space Treaty and is thus invalid
without further amendment or replacement of the Treaty itself.
The dreams and work of private aerospace organizations like SpaceX and
Moon Express may be for nothing. While their milestones are commendable and
their dreams desirable, they simply cannot achieve what they have set out to
without valid assurance—both nationally and internationally—that once they
reach outer space, they can reap what they sow. Article II of the Outer Space
Treaty should be interpreted broadly as to cover both private and state entities.
The resulting effect of Article II is a bar on all appropriation of celestial
resources, thus impeding private development in outer space and invaliding the
SPACE Act of 2015.
For private aerospace companies to achieve their goals, a shift in the current
international regulatory regime is necessary. Either the Outer Space Treaty must
undergo amendment to specifically address private appropriation, or another
treaty or international agency must replace it to oversee celestial development
and ensure adherence to important considerations of safety and ecological
fairness.
On Tuesday, February 6, 2018, SpaceX successfully launched its Falcon
Heavy rocket into the Earth’s orbit, carrying aboard Elon Musk’s own red
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convertible.158 The Falcon Heavy rocket is only one of SpaceX’s many
technological developments toward its goal of achieving celestial travel between
Earth and Mars.159 Companies like SpaceX are clearly not slowing down. The
question remains whether the international rule of law can keep up.
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